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THE PROSECUTOR V. ALEKSOVSKI, 30 MAY 
2001, JUDGMENT ON APPEAL BY ANTO NOBILO 
AGAINST FINDING OF CONTEMPT: A CRITICAL 
ANALYSIS OF THE ICTY APPEALS CHAMBER’S 
ABANDONMENT OF WITNESS PROTECTION 
MEASURES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Witness testimony is a powerful evidentiary tool. For the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (the “ICTY”), witness 
testimony is integral to the proper identification and prosecution of the 
individuals who perpetrated the atrocities committed in the Former 
Yugoslavia. In Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte’s opening statement at 
Slobodan Milosević’s trial, which she phrased as “clearly the most 
important trial to be conducted in the tribunal,”1 she explicitly recognized 
witnesses for their courage and alluded to the relative reluctance of 
witnesses to come forward out of fear of persecution.2 At one point, as if 
to alleviate their fears, Ms. Del Ponte promised witnesses the Tribunal’s 
protection.3 Lead Prosecutor Geoffrey Nice also emphasized the 
indispensable evidentiary value of witness testimony during his opening 
statement.4  
Witness testimony is also compelling on a personal level. In her 
recently published book,5 Elizabeth Neuffer followed the lives of various 
victims of the war and aptly described one witness’s (“Hamdo”) mixed 
 1. Ian Fisher, Power Drove Milosevic to Crime, Prosecutors Say as Trial Opens, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 13, 2002, at A1. The full opening statement is available at http://www.un.org/icty/latest/index.htm 
(last visited Dec. 25, 2002). 
 2. Id. at A16. “The witnesses must find in themselves the individual courage to give their 
accounts in public.” Id. See also Diane Sabom, ICC Fails Test of American Justice, INSIGHT, MAY 27, 
2002, available at 2002 WL 8158237 (stating that “practical problem for the ICTY has been the 
reluctance of witnesses to testify” and noting former ICTY Judge Patricia Wald’s concern over the 
decreasing frequency of live witnesses). 
 3. Fisher, supra note 1 at A16. “I will seek to match [the witnesses’] strength by obtaining for 
them all appropriate measures of protection available under the tribunal’s rules.” Id. Ms. Del Ponte’s 
mention of “all appropriate measures of protection” is in reference to the ICTY Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence. See infra notes 45–48 for a more complete discussion of measures of witness protection in 
the ICTY and ICTR. 
 4. Id. “This trial starts with a blank sheet of paper and writes on it only that which can be 
contributed by evidence.” Id. 
 5. ELIZABETH NEUFFER, THE KEY To MY NEIGHBOR’S HOUSE: SEEKING JUSTICE IN BOSNIA 
AND RWANDA (2001). Ms. Neuffer is an award-winning reporter for the Boston Globe. 
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feelings about testifying at Dusko Tadić’s trial.6 Hamdo, a history teacher 
from Northwest Bosnia,7 had known Mr. Tadić all his life; “[H]e could 
identify him beyond a shadow of a doubt.”8 But beyond its evidentiary 
value, for Presiding Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Hamdo’s testimony 
allowed her and the rest of the world to hear the “inexplicable”: how 
atrocities could be committed against Muslims by Serbs who formerly had 
been their friends and neighbors.9 For this reason, of all the testimony that 
Judge McDonald heard in the Tadić case, Hamdo’s was the most 
haunting.10  
Because witness testimony is so important, the ICTY, as well as 
Rwanda’s International Tribunal (the “ICTR”) and the new International 
Criminal Court (the “ICC”) provide for witness protection in their 
statutes,11 rules of procedure and evidence,12 and codes of professional 
conduct.13 The ICTY, like many civil, common law, and international 
courts, recognizes that those who offend the judicial process by 
 6. Id. at 183. “Hamdo was not frightened to testify, but he also wasn’t eager to do it. Some of 
the witnesses, as they left the stand, had told him they had found the experience cathartic. They felt 
years drop off their shoulders when they finally confronted Tadić in a courtroom and told of his 
crimes. Hamdo felt differently; he saw testifying as his duty.” Id. at 183–84. 
 7. Id. at 15. 
 8. Id. at 183. 
 9. Id. at 185. Judge McDonald asked Hamdo, in part, “How could you explain some of the 
atrocities that we have heard have been committed . . . . Given your background, your experience, 
knowing that Serbs and Muslims lived together, went to school together, intermarried, how did that 
happen?” To this Hamdo replied, in part,  
I had the key to my next-door neighbor’s [house] who was a Serb and he had my key. That is 
how we looked after each other. We visited each other for the holidays. My best man at my 
wedding was a Serb. We were friends and he was the same one who threatened us. It is 
inexplicable what happened to those people. 
Id. 
 10. Id. at 183. 
 11. See generally Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
[hereinafter “ICTY Statute”], available at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc/index.htm (last visited Dec. 
25, 2002); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda [hereinafter “ICTR Statute”], 
available at: http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html (last visited Dec. 25, 2002). See 
LEILA NADYA SADAT, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 313–89 (2002), for the most recent 
version of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court [hereinafter “Rome Statute”]. 
 12. See generally ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence [hereinafter “ICTY RPE”], available 
at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc/index.htm (last visited Dec. 25, 2002); ICTR Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence [hereinafter “ICTR RPE”], available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/rules/index.htm 
(last visited Dec. 25, 2002). See SADAT, supra note 11, at 391–480 (2002) for a complete finalized 
draft text of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the ICC [hereinafter “Rome Draft RPE”]. 
 13. See generally ICTY Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel Appearing Before the 
International Tribunal [hereinafter “ICTY Code of Professional Conduct”], available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc/index.htm (last visited Dec. 25, 2002); ICTR Code of Professional 
Conduct for Defense Counsel [hereinafter “ICTR Code of Professional Conduct”], available at 
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/basicdocs/codeconduct.htm (last visited Dec. 25, 2002).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss1/7
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manipulating witness testimony or endangering protected witnesses14 
deserve punishment for acting in contempt of court.  
In the most recent decision addressing allegations of contempt in the 
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Aleksovski (the “Nobilo Appeals Chamber 
Decision”),15 Mr. Anto Nobilo appealed the Trial Chamber’s decision in 
Le Procureur c/ Aleksovski (the “Nobilo Trial Chamber Decision”),16 
which held that Mr. Nobilo acted in contempt of the Tribunal under Rule 
77(A)(iii).17 The Nobilo Trial Chamber held that Mr. Nobilo “knowingly 
violated” a witness’s protective order,18 and he was fined.19 An immediate 
appeal was allowed, and the Nobilo Appeals Chamber reversed the Trial 
Chamber’s decision.20 The Appeals Chamber held that Mr. Nobilo did not 
have actual knowledge nor was he willfully blind to the fact that the 
witness in question was protected; therefore, he had not committed a 
knowing violation.21 The Appeals Chamber directed the Registrar to repay 
Mr. Nobilo’s fine.22 In its analysis and opinion, the Nobilo Appeals 
Chamber relied heavily upon Prosecutor v. Tadić (the “Vujin Appeals 
Chamber Decision”),23 a recent Appeals Chamber decision.24  
 14. Although the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the ICC generally allow victims and witnesses equal 
protection, this Recent Development is concerned specifically with witness protection and does not 
address special issues relating to victims of sexual assault who later take the witness stand. These 
issues fall outside the scope of this Recent Development. For a broader discussion of the issues 
surrounding sexual assault victim testimony, see KARINE LESCURE & FLORENCE TRINTIGNAC, infra 
note 41, at 43–57. See also Carlotta Gall, A Croat’s Killing Prods Action on War Atrocities, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 17, 2000, at A3 (detailing a specific account of witness persecution). 
 15. Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, IT-95-14/1, ICTY App. Ch. (May 30, 2001) [hereinafter the 
“Nobilo Appeals Chamber Decision”], available at http://www.un.org/icty/aleksovski/appeal/ 
judgement/nob-ajo10530e.htm (last visited Dec. 25, 2002). 
 16. Le Procureur c/ Aleksovski, IT-95-14/1, ICTY Tr. Ch. (Dec. 11, 1998) [hereinafter the 
“Nobilo Trial Chamber Decision”], available at http://www.un.org/icty/aleksovski/trialc/judgement/ 
nob-tj981211f.htm (last visited Dec. 25, 2002). 
 17. Nobilo Trial Chamber Decision, supra note 16, at 5. Author’s note: paragraph numbers were 
not provided in the Nobilo Trial Chamber Decision. The text uses only page numbers and therefore 
this Recent Development references page numbers for this decision. See infra note 47 for the text of 
Rule 77. 
 18. Id. at 4. 
 19. Id. at 7. Mr. Nobilo was fined 10,000 Dutch guilders (approximately 4,200 USD) 4,000 of 
which was deemed immediately payable. Id. 
 20. Nobilo Appeals Chamber Decision, supra note 15, at para. 57. 
 21. Id. at paras. 48, 52. 
 22. Id. at para. 57. 
 23. Prosecutor v. Tadic, IT- 94-1-A-R77, ICTY App. Ch. (Jan. 31, 2000) [hereinafter “Vujin 
Appeals Chamber Decision”], available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/vujin-e/index.htm (last 
visited Dec. 25, 2002).  
 24. The Appeals Chamber is common to both the ICTY and the ICTR. The ICTY Appeals 
Chamber later disposed of the Vujin Appeals Chamber Decision and upheld its initial judgment in 
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case IT-94-1-A-AR77, ICTY App. Ch. (Feb. 27, 2001), available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/vujin-e/vuj-aj010227e.htm (last visited Dec. 25, 2002). The latter 
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Part II of this Recent Development presents the history of contempt in 
common law, civil law, and in the ad-hoc tribunals, as well as in the ICC. 
Part II also discusses the Vujin Appeals Chamber Decision, in which 
contempt of court was an issue of first impression. Part III examines in 
depth the background and holding of the Nobilo Appeals Chamber 
Decision, starting with the proceedings below in the Nobilo Trial Chamber 
Decision. Part III also examines Judge Patrick Robinson’s separate 
opinion. Part IV critiques of the Nobilo Appeals Chamber Decision’s 
failure to consider public policy motivations, and of Judge Robinson’s 
opinion. Part IV also suggests that a better approach to witness protection 
may be available in the ICC. Part V concludes that the Nobilo Appeals 
Chamber Decision is a judicial anomaly in violation of public policy. 
Instead, the rationales of the Vujin Appeals Chamber, and of the Nobilo 
Trial Chamber should be instructive on the issue. In this respect, the ICC’s 
approach is more likely to achieve a sound public policy result. 
II. HISTORY 
A. Contempt of Court At Common Law and Civil Law 
Contempt of court (contemptus curiae) has been firmly rooted in 
English common law since the 12th century.25 In general, the common law 
definition of contempt of court is any conduct that might disrespect the 
authority and administration of the law, or might interfere with or 
prejudice parties to or witnesses to a proceeding.26 With respect to 
witnesses, “it is contempt for a solicitor to interfere with a witness” in any 
way that might impede a fair trial.27 Traditional contempt actions include 
intimidating a witness or a possible witness to not attend court, influencing 
a witness against a party, bribing a witness to suppress evidence, and 
appeals chamber decision did not introduce any new facts or holdings and therefore will not be 
discussed further in this Recent Development. In Prosecutor v. Simic, IT-95-9, ICTY Tr. Ch. (June 30, 
2000), available at http://www.un.org/icty/simic/trialc3/judgement/index.htm (last visited Dec. 25, 
2002), the ICTY Trial Chamber examined allegations of contempt with respect to witness harassment 
and bribery. In Prosecutor v. Simic, no one argued that the witness’ allegations, if established, would 
not constitute contempt, rather the issue was whether the truth of the allegations made by the witness 
were established beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at para. 92. Ultimately, the court held that the witness’ 
allegations were not credible. Id. at para. 96–100. For this reason, Prosecutor v. Simic is not directly 
relevant to this Recent Development and will not be discussed further.  
 25. JOHN C. FOX, THE HISTORY Of CONTEMPT OF COURT 1 (1927). 
 26. JAMES FRANCES OSWALD, CONTEMPT OF COURT 6 (3d ed. 1911). 
 27. Id. at 52. In the United Kingdom a “solicitor” is a “legal advisor who consults with clients 
and prepares legal documents but is not generally heard in High Court . . . unless specially licensed.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1399 (7th ed. 1999). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss1/7
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threatening to dismiss a witness from his or her employment because of 
his or her evidence.28 Legal scholars have said that contempt of court has a 
“dual impact”; it not only interferes with the due administration of justice 
in a particular case but also encourages similar acts in the future, and 
affects the due administration of justice in forthcoming matters.29
Contempt may be criminal or civil in nature30 but the motivation in 
both cases is to uphold the effective administration of justice.31 Civil 
contempt is the failure to comply with a court order.32 Historically, 
criminal contempt has been classified in two categories: contempt in the 
face of the court (in facie curiae) and contempt committed outside the 
court (ex facie curiae). The distinction, however, is inconsequential 
substantively.33 Contempt in the face of the court includes unlawful 
interruption, disruption, or obstruction of a court proceeding.34 It is settled 
law that common law courts have an “inherent” power to punish contempt 
in the face of the court.35  
In both the United Kingdom and in the United States there is a tension 
in the relationship between contemporary notions of freedom of speech 
and the due administration of justice. In the United Kingdom, there is 
 28. OSWALD, supra note 26, at 89.  
 29. ANTHONY ARLIDGE & DAVID EADY, THE LAW OF CONTEMPT 32 (1982). 
 30. NIGEL LOWE & GORDON BORRIE, BORRIE AND LOWE’S LAW OF CONTEMPT 2 (2d ed. 
1983). See John R. B. Palmer, Collateral Bar and Contempt: Challenging a Court Order After 
Disobeying, 88 CORNELL L. Rev. 215, 234–38 (2002) for a discussion of U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent regarding civil versus criminal contempt in the context of a collateral attack. 
 31. LOWE & BARRIE, supra note 30, at 3. “If a court lacked the means to enforce its orders, if its 
orders could be disobeyed with impunity, not only would individual litigants suffer, the whole 
administration of justice would be brought into disrepute.” Id.  
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 7. The main difference between contempt in the face of the court and contempt 
committed outside the court lies in the extent of the inherent jurisdiction of different courts. Id. 
Superior courts have jurisdiction over both forms whereas inferior courts can only punish the contempt 
in the face of the court. Id. The Tribunal incorporates aspects of both civil and criminal contempt at 
common law into its opinions.  
 Mr. Nobilo failed to obey a court order and was initially fined in money damages, which suggests 
civil contempt, however, the court’s claim of an “inherent” power to punish contempt comports with 
the common law definition of criminal contempt in the face of the court. The Tribunal rarely states 
explicitly whether contempt is criminal or civil in its nature, perhaps because it wished to maintain a 
neutral tone and to avoid using an overtly common law approach. See Michael Bohlander, 
International Criminal Defence Ethics: The Law of Professional Conduct for Defence Counsel 
Appearing Before International Criminal Tribunals, 1 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 75, 96–97 (2000), for a 
discussion of the common law approach exemplified in the ICTY Code of Professional Conduct and 
ICTY RPE. See also infra notes 85, 113, for examples of how the ICTY tries to avoid emphasizing its 
common law features. 
 34. LOWE & BARRIE, supra note 30, at 6.  
 35. Id. “Being an inherent power means that it cannot be lost by technicalities . . . nor should it 
be regarded as being taken away, restricted or controlled by statute save where it is clear that that must 
be the intention of the legislature.” Id. at 6–7. 
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strong authority that the most important public interest is the due 
administration of justice and free speech is protected only after a trial has 
concluded.36 Accordingly, in 1981, the United Kingdom enacted the 
Contempt of Court Act.37 In the United States, the Constitution protects 
freedom of expression;38 constraints on free speech are allowed only to the 
extent that they present a clear and present danger to the administration of 
justice.39 However, the United States Code also specifically reserves a 
court’s power to punish acts of contempt of its authority, including 
“misbehavior” while in a courtroom and “disobedience” of a court 
decree,40 which may in some cases offend an individual’s interpretation of 
free speech.  
Although contempt is primarily a common law concept, interference 
with the proper administration of justice is a mutual concern among 
common and civil law systems. For example, the question of protection of 
victims and witnesses in civil law national jurisdictions has been recently 
addressed in France’s Nouveau Code Pénal.41 In the Vujin Appeals 
Chamber Decision, discussed below, the Appeals Chamber noted that 
 36. C.J. MILLER, CONTEMPT OF COURT 13 (1989). In the U.K. landmark decision, Att’y Gen. v. 
Times Newspapers Ltd., [1974] A.C. 273 (H.L. 1973), an injunction was granted on behalf of a drug 
manufacturer, Distillers, to restrain the Sunday Times newspaper from publishing an article regarding 
a thalidomide tragedy. The Sunday Times published the article, which in effect pressured Distillers to 
make a better settlement offer to affected families. Id. at 243. Distillers made a formal complaint 
contending that the article was contempt of court. Id. at 243–44. Despite arguments that it would best 
serve the public interest to publicize the issues involved, on appeal the House of Lords upheld the 
injunction, and declared that any public prejudgment of the issues in pending litigation constituted a 
contempt tantamount to “trial by newspaper.” Id. at 44. 
 37. MILLER, supra note 36, at 14. 
 38. Id. See also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 39. MILLER, supra note 36, at 13. See also Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). 
 40. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (2000). This section provides that:  
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its 
discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as— 
(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the 
administration of justice; 
(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions; 
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command. 
Id. 
 41. NOUVEAU CODE PÉNAL art. 434–15 (Fr.). This article in France’s New Code of Criminal 
Procedure provides that suborning of witnesses is an offense to the court. Id. Examples of such 
improper conduct include: “[u]sing promises, offers, presents, pressure, threats, actions, maneuvers or 
ruses during proceedings or with a view to an application to the courts or by the defense in order to 
force another person to either make or produce a mendacious deposition, statement or evidence . . . .” 
Id. See also KARINE LESCURE & FLORENCE TRINTIGNAC, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE FOR FORMER 
YUGOSLAVIA: THE WORKING OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HAGUE 49–50 
(1996) (discussing “the question of victim and witness protection before national jurisdictions” and 
specific provisions of France’s New Code of Criminal Procedure). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss1/7
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while the law of contempt has now been codified in the United Kingdom, 
it is essentially a broad non-statutory power within the inherent 
jurisdiction of a common law court.42 In civil law systems, however, 
conduct that interferes with the proper administration of justice is 
governed by statutes specifying more narrowly defined conduct.43
B. Contempt of Court In International Criminal Tribunals: Statutes, Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence, and the Code of Professional Conduct in 
the ICTY, the ICTR and the ICC 
The statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR clearly establish protection for 
victims and witnesses.44 Each body’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
impose on the Registrar a duty to create a Victims and Witnesses Unit, to 
recommend protective measures, and to make counseling available.45 The 
ICTY and ICTR further provide “Measures for the Protection of Victims 
and Witnesses.”46 Both Tribunals specifically define and reserve the right 
to punish “Contempt of the Tribunal.”47
 42. See infra note 66.
 43. See infra note 71. See also Palmer, supra note 30, at 239–40 n.142 (2002) (“Although it is 
deeply ingrained in common law thinking, the contempt power is alien to most civil law countries, 
which tend to view it as both unnecessary and contrary to basic notions of governance.”). 
 44. See ICTY Statute, supra note 4, at art. 22; ICTR Statute, supra note 11, at art. 21. 
 45. See ICTY RPE, supra note 12, at Rule 34; ICTR RPE, supra note 12, at Rule 34. 
 46. See ICTY RPE, supra note 12, at Rule 75; ICTR RPE, supra note 12, at Rule 75. Rule 75 is 
almost identical in both courts. ICTR Rule 75 provides in relevant part that: 
(A) A Judge or a Chamber may, proprio motu or at the request of either party, or of the victim 
or witness concerned, or of the Victims and Witnesses Unit, order appropriate measures for 
the privacy and protection of victims and witnesses, provided that the measures are consistent 
with the rights of the accused. 
(B) A Chamber may hold an in camera proceeding . . .  
(C) A Chamber shall . . . control the manner of questioning to avoid any harassment or 
intimidation. 
Id. 
 47. See ICTY RPE, supra note 12, at Rule 77; ICTR RPE, supra note 12, at Rule 77. The ICTY’s 
version of Rule 77 is significantly more detailed that that of the ICTR. The ICTY’s version provides in 
relevant part that: 
(A) The Tribunal in the exercise of its inherent power may hold in contempt those who 
knowingly and willfully interfere with its administration of justice, including any person who 
 . . .  
(ii) discloses information relating to those proceedings in knowing violation of an order of a 
Chamber; 
 . . .  
(iv) threatens, intimidates, causes any injury or offers a bribe to, or otherwise interferes with, 
a witness who is giving, has given, or is about to give evidence in proceedings before a 
Chamber, or a potential witness; 
 . . .  
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The ICC also provides considerable protection for witnesses and 
victims. Like the ICTY and the ICTR, the ICC’s statutes directly provides 
for the “Protection of the Victims and Witnesses and their Participation in 
the Proceedings.”48 Unlike the ICTY and the ICTR, the ICC wishes to 
avoid common law terminology and to maintain a neutral tone. Therefore 
the ICC statutes do not specifically discuss “Contempt of Court,” instead 
granting the ICC jurisdiction over “offenses against the administration of 
justice,” which prohibits various means of witness corruption.49 The ICC 
has the power to sanction those who commit such offenses.50  
The most significant difference between the Ad-Hoc Tribunals and the 
ICC is that the ICC has a more detailed Victims and Witnesses Unit in its 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, in which the Registrar is charged with 
broader responsibilities which include making long–and short–term plans 
for witness protection and with taking measures to emphasize the 
confidential nature of witness protection.51 The ICC also provides specific 
measures for the “Protection of Victims and Witnesses,”52 and explains the 
(C) When a Chamber has reason to believe that a person may be in contempt of the Tribunal, 
it may:  
(i) direct the Prosecutor to investigate the matter with a view to the preparation and 
submission of an indictment for contempt; 
(ii) where the Prosecutor, in the view of the Chamber, has a conflict of interest with respect to 
the relevant conduct, direct the Registrar to appoint an amicus curiae to investigate the matter 
and report back to the Chamber as to whether there are sufficient grounds for instigating 
contempt proceedings; or 
(iii) initiate proceedings itself. 
ICTY RPE, supra note 12, at Rule 77. See Bohlander, supra note 33, at 83–90 for a detailed analysis 
of Rule 77. 
 48. Rome Statute, supra note 11, at art. 68. The ICC takes a broad approach to witness and 
victim protection, but incorporates some of the wording from the ICTY and ICTR Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence. Rome Statute, art. 68(1) provides, in relevant part, that: “The Court shall take 
appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical and psychological well-being, dignity and privacy 
of victims and witnesses . . . .” Id. at art. 68(1). Rome Statute, art. 68(2) states that: “[T]he Chambers 
or the Court may . . . conduct any part of the proceedings in camera or allows the presentation of 
evidence by electronic or other special means . . . . .” Id. at art. 68(2). 
 49. Id. at art. 70(1)(c). This section allows the Court jurisdiction over the offense of “[c]orruptly 
influencing a witness, obstructing or interfering with the attendance or testimony of a witness, 
retaliating against a witness for giving testimony or destroying, tampering with or interfering with the 
collection of evidence.” Id. See supra note 47 for comparable provisions in the ICTY. See also 
Bohlander, supra note 33, at 87 (discussing the ICC’s “explicit” sanctions for contempt and comparing 
them to the ICTY’s penalties). See also supra note 33, infra note 118, for examples of how the ICTY 
attempts to maintain a neutral tone. 
 50. Rome Statute, supra note 11, at art. 71. 
 51. Rome Draft RPE, supra note 12, at Rule 17. See generally id. at Rules 16–19. See also infra 
notes 146–51. 
 52. Id. at Rules 87–93. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss1/7
p297 Burkey book pages.doc4/12/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
2004] THE PROSECUTOR V. ALEKSOVSKI 305 
 
 
 
 
 
 
consequences of offenses and misconduct against the Court, including 
refusal to comply with a court order.53  
The Code of Professional Conduct for Defense Counsel Appearing 
Before the International Tribunal is another important regulatory 
instrument in the protection of witnesses and prevention of interference 
with the proper administration of justice in the ICTY and ICTR.54 In the 
ICTY, for example, the Code imposes a duty of fair representation55 and 
specifically defines professional misconduct on the part of defense 
counsel.56 The ICTY and ICTR consulted the ethical codes of several civil 
and common law countries in creating their own Codes of Professional 
Conduct.57 Although the ICC does not yet have a separately titled Code of 
Professional Conduct,58 witness protection and the court’s administration 
provisions have been provided for directly in the ICC Statute itself and in 
its Rules of Procedure and Evidence.59  
 53. Id. at Rules 162–72. 
 54. See generally ICTY Code of Professional Conduct, supra note 13. 
 55. See generally ICTY Code of Professional Conduct, supra note 13, at art. 3 (iii).  
 56. Id. at art. 20. Article 35 states: 
It shall be professional misconduct for counsel, inter alia, to: 
(i) violate or attempt to violate the statute, the Rules, this Code or any other applicable law, or 
to knowingly assist or induce another person to do so, or to do so through the acts of another 
person; 
(ii) commit a criminal act which reflects adversely on counsel's honesty, trustworthiness or 
fitness as counsel; 
(iii) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;  
(iv) engage in conduct which is prejudicial to the proper administration of justice before the 
Tribunal; or 
(v) provide inaccurate information or fail to disclose information regarding cousel’s 
qualifications to practice before the Tribunal as set out in the Rules and, where counsel has 
been assigned to a client, the Directive. 
Id. 
 57. See Bohlander, supra note 33, at 81–82 (noting that the American Bar Association Code of 
Ethics clearly influenced the contents and wording of the ICTY Code of Professional Conduct). 
 58. See Rome Draft RPE, supra note 12, at Rule 8. A Code of Professional Conduct will soon be 
adopted. See also Bohlander, supra note 33, at 97–98 for a discussion of the future of defense ethics in 
the ICC. 
 59. See supra notes 48–53 for a detailed description of measures for the protection of victims and 
witnesses in the Rome Statute. 
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C. ICTY “Precedent”:60 The Vujin Appeals Chamber Decision 
Contempt of court was an issue of first impression for the Appeals 
Chamber in the Vujin Appeals Chamber Decision,61 which set out the 
public policy, jurisdictional, procedural, and sentencing guidelines for 
future decisions.62  
First, the Vujin Appeals Chamber held that public policy favors strict 
enforcement of the due administration of justice.63 In order to ensure peace 
and orderly conduct, courts must have the power to enforce the judicial 
process and to maintain a certain appearance of dignity in the face of the 
public.64 The law of contempt was not developed in response to offended 
judges or simply to punish rude behavior in court, rather, “it is justice 
itself which is flouted by a contempt of court[.]”65
Second, the Vujin Appeals Chamber held that the Tribunal has a pre-
existing power to deal with contempt—“inherent jurisdiction.”66 The 
Vujin Appeals Chamber began by citing Rule 77(E) of the Tribunal’s 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence as evidence of its inherent power to deal 
with contempt.67 Next, the Vujin Appeals Chamber acknowledged that 
 60. In international law, the concept of precedent differs from that of the common law. 
Essentially, all opinions—judicial and academic—are of value and are incorporated into judicial 
opinions. There is no such thing as “binding” precedent in international law. Where “precedent” is 
used in this Recent Development, the author means to refer to decisions pre-dating the Nobilo Appeals 
Chamber Decision that had a persuasive influence on its outcome. See Cecile E.M. Meijer, News From 
the International Criminal Tribunal: Part I-International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), 9 No.1 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 27, 29–30 (2001), for a discussion of the ICTY’s 
complete and independent competence, even with respect to ICJ opinions. 
 61. See supra note 24.  
 62. See supra notes 63–85. 
 63. Vujin Appeals Chamber Decision, supra note 23, at para. 16. 
 64. Id.  
 65. Id. The Judgment specifically states that:  
In order to avoid any misconception, it is perhaps necessary to emphasise that the law of 
contempt as developed at common law is not designed to buttress the dignity of the judges or 
to punish mere affronts or insults to a court or tribunal; rather, it is justice itself which is 
flouted by a contempt of court, not the individual court or judge who is attempting to 
administer justice. 
Id. 
 66. See id. at para. 19. “The Tribunal has, since its creation, assumed the right to punish for 
contempt.” Id. Mr. Vujin made the argument that changes in the ICTY RPE prejudiced his rights. Id. at 
para. 27. The Appeals Chamber rejected this argument by saying that the Tribunal’s power is not 
contingent upon specific reference in the ICTY RPE. Id. at para. 28. 
 67. Id. at para. 12. “Nothing in this Rule affects the inherent power of the Tribunal to hold in 
contempt those who knowingly and wilfully interfere with its administration of justice.” Id. (quoting 
ICTY RPE 77(E)). This language is now incorporated in Rule 77(A). See supra note 47. Later the 
Appeals Chamber stated that the content of its inherent power to punish contempt may not be 
discerned by reference to the wording of Rule 77. Id. at para. 24. 
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although the Tribunal’s statute does not mention an express power to deal 
with contempt, the Tribunal’s jurisdiction derives from its judicial 
functions, which are to ensure that the exercise of jurisdiction is not 
frustrated and to protect the basic judicial objectives; thus, the Tribunal’s 
jurisdiction is “inherent.”68  
In order to ascertain the content of its inherent power, the Vujin 
Appeals Chamber cited the “usual sources of international law.”69 Absent 
any specific customary international law directly on point, the Charter of 
the International Military Tribunal, the Allied Control Council Law No. 10 
(20 December 1995), and the U.S. Military Tribunals all provided an 
“international analogue”; that is, examples of other courts’ exercise of the 
right to punish contempt of court.70 In addition, the Vujin Appeals 
Chamber found the “general principles of laws common to the major legal 
systems of the world” to be instructive on the issue.71  
Third, the Vujin Appeals Chamber determined the procedural structure 
of a contempt proceeding. After setting forth the specific allegations of 
contempt,72 and examining the witnesses’ statements in detail,73 the Vujin 
Appeals Chamber cited two principles of general application particularly 
relevant to the issue at hand.74 The first principle states that a Tribunal 
must look at all evidence collectively.75 The second principle states that 
 68. Id. at para. 13. See also id. at para. 18. 
 69. Id. at para. 13. 
 70. Id. at para. 14. 
 71. Id. at para. 15. The Vujin Appeals Chamber noted that although historically the law of 
contempt has always been and remains a “creature of the common law” unknown to civil law, 
nevertheless, many civil law systems had established similar offenses. Id. See also id. at para. 17.  
Although the law of contempt has now been partially codified in the United Kingdom, the 
power to deal with contempt at common law has essentially remained one which is part of the 
inherent jurisdiction of the superior courts of record, rather than based on statute. On the other 
hand, the analogous control exercised in the civil law systems . . . is based solely upon statute. 
Id. (footnote omitted). The Appeals Chamber then went on to cite the German Penal Code, the 
Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, the French Nouveau Code Pénal, and the Russian 
Criminal Code as examples. Id. at para. 17 n.20. Later the Chamber stated, “the content of [its inherent 
power to punish contempt] may be discerned by reference to the usual sources of international law, but 
not by reference to the wording of [Rule 77].” Id. at para. 24. 
 72. Id. at para. 41. The specific allegations against Mr. Vujin were: putting forward a case known 
to be false, manipulating proposed witnesses, and bribing a witness to tell lies. Id. For the details of the 
allegations and the Vujin Appeals Chamber’s specific holdings for each, see id. at para. 131–60. 
 73. Id. at 42–90. 
 74. Id. at para. 91–93. 
 75. Id. at para. 92. This general principle states: 
[A] tribunal of fact must never look at the evidence of each witness separately, as if it existed 
in a hermetically sealed compartment; it is the accumulation of all the evidence in the case 
which must be considered. The evidence of one witness, when considered by itself, may 
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statements made by witnesses out of court that conflict with statements 
made in court are admissible as far as they have probative value, 
consistent with the Tribunal’s civil law hearsay approach.76 In addition to 
the rules regarding evidence, preceding events may also be considered in 
order to demonstrate a particular course of conduct or to explain the events 
at issue.77  
Fourth, the Vujin Appeals Chamber made it clear that contempt is a 
serious violation78 requiring punishment.79 Mr. Vujin committed 
professional misconduct.80 Although the Code does not provide a specific 
sanction for misconduct, pursuant to the ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, Rules 4581 and 4682 and Article 20 of the Directive on 
appear at first to be of poor quality, but it may gain strength from other evidence in the case. 
The converse also holds true. 
Id. 
 76. Id. at para. 93. This general principle states that: 
Where such out of court statement is merely hearsay, the common law denies it any value as 
evidence of the truth of what has been said out of court, and restricts its relevance to the issue 
of the witness’s credit. On the other hand, the civil law admits the hearsay material without 
restriction, provided that it has probative value; the weight to be afforded to it as evidence of 
the truth of what was said is considered at the end of all the evidence. This Tribunal has, by 
its Rules effectively rejected the common law approach. 
Id. (footnote omitted). The Appeals Chamber then acknowledged that, “the weight to be afforded to 
[hearsay] material will usually be less than that given to testimony of a witness who has given it under 
a form of oath and who has been cross-examined, although even this will depend upon the infinitely 
variable circumstances which surround hearsay material.” Id. See ICTY RPE, supra note 12, at Rule 
89(C); ICTR RPE, supra note 12, at Rule 89(C) (“A Chamber may admit any relevant evidence which 
it deems to have probative value.”). See also Rome Statute, supra note 11, at art. 69(4) (allowing the 
ICC to determine admissibility of evidence taking into account probative value of the evidence); Rome 
Draft RPE, supra note 12, at Rule 63. 
 77. Vujin Appeals Chamber Decision, supra note 23, at para. 94. In this decision, the Vujin 
Appeals Chamber considered the following: (1) entries that Mr. Tadic made in his diary regarding his 
concern that Mr. Vujin was not conducting a proper defense, and (2) a Yugoslav journalist’s article 
reporting that the Serbian legal profession was working to ensure that persons before the Tribunal did 
not expose those connected with State leadership to risk of prosecution, regardless of a particular 
defendant’s needs. Id. See also id. at para. 105–15. 
 78. Id. at para. 166. “Courts and tribunals necessarily rely very substantially upon the honesty 
and propriety of counsel in the conduct of litigation. Counsel are permitted important privileges by the 
law which are justified only upon the basis that they can be trusted not to abuse them.” Id. The 
Appeals Chamber later stated that, in light of the additionally offensive fact that in this case, Mr. 
Vujin, in his capacity as defense counsel to Mr. Tadic, had acted against the interest of his client, 
“[t]he contempt in this case remains a serious one, no matter what disadvantage was or was not in fact 
caused to Tadic.” Id. at para. 167. 
 79. Id. at para. 168. “The contempt requires punishment which serves not only as retribution for 
what has been done but also as deterrence of others who may be tempted to act in the same way.” Id. 
 80. Id. at para. 169.  
 81. Id. at para. 170–72. See also ICTY RPE, supra note 12, at Rule 45. Rule 45(A), (B) states: 
(A) Whenever the interests of justice so demand, counsel shall be assigned to suspects or 
accused who lack the means to remunerate such counsel. Such assignments shall be treated in 
accordance with the procedure established in a Directive set out by the Registrar and 
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Assignment of Defense Counsel, the Registrar has the power to strike any 
defense counsel from the list of assigned counsel, and the Chamber 
strongly suggested that Mr. Vujin’s name be removed.83 The Vujin 
Appeals Chamber concluded that imprisonment was too severe a 
punishment, but that a substantial fine, amounting to 15,000 Dutch 
guilders (approximately 6,250 USD), was necessary to achieve the 
purposes for which punishment is imposed,84 namely retribution and 
deterrence.85
III. THE NOBILO TRIAL CHAMBER AND APPEALS CHAMBER DECISIONS 
A. General Background: Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia 
On May 8, 1989, Slobodan Milosevic became president of Serbia.86 In 
June of 1991, Slovenia and Croatia seceded from Yugoslavia and, soon 
thereafter, Slovenia won its independence.87 In Croatia, however, conflict 
between Serbian troops and Croatian defense forces resulted in full-scale 
war, which did not end until January 1992.88 In April of 1992, just as the 
United States and European countries recognized the independence of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosnian Serb forces attacked the Herzegovinian 
approved by the permanent Judges.  
(B) A list of counsel who, in addition to fulfilling the requirements of Rule 44, have shown 
that they possess reasonable experience in criminal and/or international law and have 
indicated their willingness to be assigned by the Tribunal to any person detained under the 
authority of the Tribunal lacking the means to remunerate counsel, shall be kept by the 
Registrar. 
Id. 
 82. Vujin Appeals Chamber Decision, supra note 23, at para. 170–72. See also ICTY RPE, supra 
note 12, at Rule 46. Rule 46(A)(i), (ii) states: 
A)  (i) A Chamber may, after a warning, refuse audience to counsel if, in its opinion, the 
conduct of that counsel is offensive, abusive or otherwise obstructs the proper conduct of the 
proceedings. 
(ii) The Chamber may also determine that counsel is no longer eligible to represent a suspect 
or accused before the Tribunal pursuant to Rule 44 and 45. 
Id. 
 83. Vujin Appeals Chamber Decision, supra note 23, at para. 171–172. See ICTY Statute, supra 
note 11, at art. 17, for a detailed list of the Registry’s responsibilities. See Bohlander, supra note 33, at 
83, for a discussion of the broader implications of the ICTY Code of Professional Conduct, art. 46. 
 84. Vujin Appeals Chamber Decision, supra note 23, at para. 173. 
 85. Id. at para. 168. The Tribunal imposed civil sanctions but never directly addressed whether 
contempt was criminal or civil in nature. See supra note 33, infra note 118, regarding the Tribunal’s 
mixed treatment of the offense of contempt. 
 86. See Ian Fischer, Milosevic on Trial: The Accusations, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2002, at A10, for 
a succinct summary of the events leading up to the conflict in the Balkans. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
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city of Sarajevo.89 From March of 1992 until December of 1995, 
approximately 200,000 Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats and other non-
Serbs died and millions were forced to leave their homes.90 It was during 
this time that the allegations of contempt addressed in this Recent 
Development took place. The ICTY has jurisdiction over crimes against 
humanity taking place in the Former Yugoslavia from 1991 onward.91 
Subsequent clashes between Serbian forces and non-Serbs continued until 
1999.92
B. The Nobilo Trial Chamber Decision 
The Nobilo Trial Chamber held that when defense counsel deliberately 
abstains from learning the protective circumstances under which a witness 
gave evidence, and subsequently reveals that witness’s identity, he acts in 
contempt of the Tribunal.93  
Mr. Nobilo, in his capacity as defense counsel, presented a map 
prepared by a protected witness in open court and asked the defense 
witness to identify the author of the map, thus naming Witness K, a 
protected witness.94 On September 25, 1998, the Prosecutor lodged a 
 89. Id.
 90. Id. See Human Rights Watch, Europe/Central Asia: Bosnia and Herzegovenia, at 
http://www.hrw.org/europe/b-h.php (last visited Feb. 24, 2002), for a reputable non-governmental 
organization’s detailed account of the atrocities committed during the conflict in the Balkans.
 91. Nobilo Trial Chamber Decision, supra note 16, at 1. 
 92. In November 1995, Mr. Milosevic and leaders in Croatia and Bosnia signed the Dayton 
Accords to end the crimes being committed by Serbs against non-Serbs. Unfortunately, this did not 
end the violence. See Human Rights Watch, Bosnia-Herzegovenia: A Failure in the Making: Human 
Rights and the Dayton Agreement, at http://www.hrw.org/summaries/s.bosnia966.html (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2002) (discussing the violence committed after the Dayton Accords).  
 Mr. Milosevic’s trial is underway at the time of the writing of this Recent Development. This 
Recent Development presents a prospective approach to future decisions in the ICTY. Although this 
Recent Development is limited to addressing the specific decisions available at the time of its writing, 
should the issue of contempt arise in conjunction with Mr. Milosevic’s trial, for example, it is likely 
that the same general issues and concerns articulated herein would apply. 
 93. Nobilo Trial Chamber Decision, supra note 16, at 5. See supra notes 15–19, for details of 
Mr. Nobilo’s fine and punishment at the Trial Court level. All references made to the Nobilo Trial 
Chamber have been translated by the author of this Recent Development from the original French into 
English. The decision is published only in French.  
 94. Id. at 3. The proceedings against Mr. Nobilo arose out of the previous trial of Zlatko 
Aleksovski, in which Mr. Nobilo was Aleksovski’s defense counsel. Nobilo Appeals Chamber 
Decision, supra note 15, at para. 2. The Aleksovski trial involved the evidence of a map prepared by 
Witness K, whose identity, face, and profession were specifically protected in order that he not face 
persecution for what the map revealed. Id. at para. 3. In order to protect his identity, the Tribunal 
lowered the blinds when Witness K was in the courtroom, intentionally distorted witness K’s facial 
features on the video recording and, at all times when he could be identified, held the proceedings in 
“closed session.” Id. This information was recorded in the Aleksovski transcript. See id. at n.3. Nobilo 
Appeals Chamber Decision, supra note 15, at para. 3. The map Witness K had prepared revealed the 
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complaint with the Trial Chamber against Mr. Nobilo95 in accordance with 
Rule 77 of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence,96 which states that 
those who knowingly violate the Tribunal’s orders act in contempt of the 
Tribunal.97 Mr. Nobilo’s defense was that he did not know of Witness K’s 
protected status, and therefore he could not have acted in “knowing 
violation” as required by Rule 77.98
The Nobilo Trial Chamber asserted that Mr. Nobilo, in his capacity as 
defense counsel before the Tribunal, had certain professional and ethical 
obligations.99 The Trial Chamber specifically emphasized the public policy 
deployment of various military forces in the Lašva Valley area in Bosnia and Herzegovina in early 
1993. Id. at para. 4.  
 95. Nobilo Trial Chamber Decision, supra note 16, 2–3. 
 96. Id. See supra note 47, for the text of Rule 77. 
 97. Id. The Nobilo Trial Chamber relied on an earlier version of ICTY RPE 77 (A)(iii) and (v). 
Nobilo Trial Chamber Decision, supra note 16, 5–6.  See supra note 47, for an up-to-date version of 
ICTY RPE 77. 
 98. Nobilo Trial Chamber Decision, supra note 16, at 4. Mr. Nobilo pled his actions were “bonne 
foi,” or “bona fide” (“good faith”). Id. According to Mr. Nobilo’s statement, Nobilo was told that “a” 
witness (Witness K) had the facts, Mr. Nobilo presented a map in the Aleksovski trial, which showed 
the deployment of military forces in the Lašva Valley area. Nobilo Appeals Chamber Decision, supra 
note 16, at para. 4. Mr. Mikulicic, counsel to Mr. Aleksovski, and Mr. Nobilo’s roommate at The 
Hague, later confirmed this, and provided him with a copy of the map. Nobilo Appeals Chamber 
Decision, supra note 15, at para. 12. Mr. Nobilo inferred that Witness K was the sole author of the 
map, which Mr. Nobilo later used in the Blaškic trial during witness examination, when he revealed 
Witness K’s identity. Id. Although the transcript was available to him, Mr. Nobilo did not read the 
transcript of the Aleksovski trial, which would have revealed Witness K’s protected status. See Nobilo 
Appeals Chamber Decision, supra note 15, at para. 12. Despite the fact that Mr. Mikulicic was present 
when Witness K was granted protective measures, Mr. Nobilo did not ask whether Witness K was 
protected because Nobilo never intended to reveal the witness’ identity during the Blaškic trial—it was 
a spontaneous decision. See Nobilo Appeals Chamber Decision, supra note 15, para. 14. See supra 
note 47, for the text of Rule 77. 
 99. Nobilo Trial Chamber Decision, supra note 16, at 4. His professional obligations were to 
comply with the rules and decisions of the Tribunal, to take all necessary steps to ensure that his 
activities did not discredit the Tribunal, and to verify that none of his actions violated a Tribunal 
decision. Id. The Trial Court cited ICTY RPE 44(B), now designated as 44(C) (“Appointment, 
Qualifications, and Duty of Counsel”) in support of this assertion. Rule 44(C) states: 
In the performance of their duties counsel shall be subject to the relevant provisions of the 
Statute, the Rules, the Rules of Detention and any other rules or regulations adopted by the 
Tribunal, the Host Country Agreement, the Code of Professional Conduct for Defence 
Counsel and the codes of practice and ethics governing their profession and, if applicable, the 
Directive on the Assignment of Defence Counsel set out by the Registrar and approved by the 
permanent Judges.  
ICTY RPE, supra note 12, at Rule 44(C). See ICTY RPE, supra note 12, at Rule 44–46, for the 
detailed qualifications expected of counsel appearing before the Tribunal.  
 The Nobilo Trial Chamber also relied on ICTR Code of Professional Conduct, art. 12(1) (“Rules 
of the Tribunal”) and art. 15(1) (“Impartiality of the Tribunal”) for support. Nobilo Trial Chamber 
Decision, supra note 4. Article 12(1) states: “[c]ounsel must at all times comply with the Rules and 
such rulings as to conduct and procedure as may be applied by the Tribunal in its proceedings. Counsel 
must at all times have due regard to the fair conduct of proceedings.” ICTR Code of Professional 
Conduct, supra note 13, at art. 12(1). Article 15(1) states, “[c]ounsel must take all necessary steps to 
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reasons supporting witness protection, namely, that it not only protects 
witnesses’ lives but also protects the proper functioning of the Tribunal.100 
The Trial Chamber held that it is a knowing violation not only to 
deliberately violate a court order,101 but also to deliberately abstain from 
learning the protective circumstances under which a witness gave 
evidence,102 as was the case with Mr. Nobilo.103 Neither actual knowledge 
nor willful blindness was specifically proven. 
C. The Nobilo Appeals Chamber Decision 
The Nobilo Appeals Chamber held that there was no basis in the 
evidence that Mr. Nobilo had actual knowledge or was willfully blind to 
Witness K’s protective court order.104 Therefore, defense counsel did not 
act in contempt of court in knowing violation of the Tribunal’s order under 
Rule 77.105 The Nobilo Appeals Chamber thus reversed the Trial 
Chamber’s findings, and directed the Registrar to repay Mr. Nobilo the 
fine imposed by the Trial Chamber.106  
On appeal, Mr. Nobilo asserted that Rule 77 requires actual 
knowledge.107 The prosecution countered that actual knowledge is not 
necessary to prove a knowing violation where willful blindness has been 
proven.108 To resolve the matter, the Nobilo Appeals Chamber relied 
ensure that their actions do not bring proceedings before the Tribunal into disrepute.” Id. at art. 15(1). 
 100. Nobilo Trial Chamber Decision, supra note 16, at 4. The Chamber stated that the 
responsibility to protect witnesses extends to all the participants of the Tribunal’s work, including 
lawyers. Id. 
 101. Id. (“Une Violation delibérée.”). 
 102. Id. (“L’abstention delibérée.”). 
 103. Id. at 5. The court’s reasoning was fourfold. First, Mr. Nobilo had assured himself that the 
map was a public document. Therefore, he clearly understood the importance of proper presentation of 
evidence. Id. Second, an experienced lawyer before the ICTY such as Mr. Nobilo should have known 
to assure himself that Witness K was not protected before divulging his profession and identity before 
the Tribunal. Id. Third, the information was easily ascertainable through simple and direct means. Id. 
Finally, had he merely sought the information in a superficial manner, it would have afforded him the 
necessary awareness to avoid such a violation. Id. 
 104. Nobilo Appeals Chamber Decision, supra note 15, at 48–54. 
 105. Nobilo Appeals Chamber Decision, supra note 15, at para. 48–52. See supra note 47, for the 
text of Rule 77. 
 106. Id. at para. 57. See also supra notes 20–24. 
 107. Id. at para. 25. First, Mr. Nobilo argued that that Rule 77 “requires proof of actual 
knowledge” of a protective order and intent to disregard it. Id. Second, he argued that “constructive 
notice is insufficient to prove actual knowledge” and there was no evidence thereof. Id. Third, he 
argued that “willful blindness is not a substitute for actual knowledge” and there was no evidence 
thereof. Id. Fourth, he argued that “any standard imposed other than actual knowledge was not an 
offense [understood under] international law at the time.” Id. See supra note 47, for the text of Rule 
77. 
 108. Id. First, the prosecution countered that “knowledge may be inferred from acts and 
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heavily upon the recently decided Vujin Appeals Chamber Decision.109 
There is no specific mention in the ICTY Statute of the Tribunal’s power 
to punish contempt.110 The issue had been one of first impression for the 
Vujin Appeals Chamber,111 and according to the Nobilo Appeals Chamber, 
the Vujin Appeals Chamber “clearly set out the Tribunal’s power to 
prosecute and punish contempt.”112 Contempt was known to international 
law at the time the offense was committed and therefore the court 
determined that the principle of nullum crimen sine lege did not apply.113
In its determination of whether a knowing violation requires actual 
knowledge,114 the Nobilo Appeals Chamber examined common law cases 
of contempt115 and determined that actual knowledge could not be 
circumstances” and the evidence points to such knowledge. Id. Second, although the “evidence 
supported a finding of actual knowledge[,] . . . actual knowledge is not required where wilful 
blindness has been proved.” Id. Third, the evidence supported a finding of willful blindness. Id. 
Fourth, “there is no requirement to prove a wilful intention to disobey the [protective] order, [and] it is 
sufficient to establish that the act . . . was . . . deliberate and not accidental.” Id. Fifth, ignorance of the 
standard imposed is no excuse for its violation. Id. 
 109. Id. at para. 30–35 (referring to the Vujin Appeals Chamber Decision, supra note 23, at para. 
12–18, 25–26). 
 110. Nobilo Appeals Chamber Decision, supra note 15, at para. 30 (referring to the Vujin Appeals 
Chamber Decision, supra note 23, para. 13). 
 111. Id. In  the Vujin Appeals Chamber case, the court concluded that the Tribunal had, by virtue 
of its judicial function, the inherent jurisdiction to ensure that its express jurisdiction is not frustrated, 
and to punish conduct that interferes with its proper administration of justice. Id. See supra notes 60–
85, for a more detailed summary of the Vujin Appeals Chamber Decision.  
 112. Nobilo Appeals Chamber Decision, supra note 15, para. 35 (referring generally to Prosecutor 
v. Tadić, Case IT-94-1-A-AR77, ICTY App. Ch. (Feb. 27, 2001)), reaffirmed the Vujin Appeals 
Chamber Decision.  
 113. Nobilo Appeals Chamber Decision, supra note 15, at para. 38. Mr. Nobilo had argued that 
the international world did not know about the offense at the time and the prosecution countered that 
ignorance of the law is no excuse. Id. at para. 37. Relying upon the principle of nullum crimen sine 
lege (“no crime without a law”), the Nobilo Appeals Chamber quickly disposed of this issue. Id. at 
para. 38. This principle requires that an act must constitute a crime at the time of its commission in 
order for a person to be found guilty of such a crime. Id. The Nobilo Appeals Chamber reiterated that 
“[t]he Tribunal’s inherent power to deal with contempt has necessarily existed ever since its creation, 
and the extent of that power has not altered by reason of the amendments made to the Tribunal’s rules 
or by reason of its decisions interpreting or clarifying that power.” Id.  
 114. Id. at para. 39–48. 
 115. Id. at 41. The Nobilo Appeals Chamber stated: 
[T]he law of contempt originated as, and has remained, a creature of common law . . . . It is 
therefore to the common law that reference must initially be made to determine the scope of 
the law of contempt—recognising of course that an international tribunal . . . must take into 
account its different setting within the basic structure of the international community. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). The Nobilo Appeals Chamber noted the following cases as examples: 
Oldham’s Press Ltd.; ex parte Attorney General [1957] 1 Q.B. 73, 79 (discussing the deliberate 
publication of material with knowledge of the existence of a trial with the specific intent to influence 
the result); Smith v. Lakeman [1856] 26 Ch 306, 306 (discussing the deliberate publication of material 
with knowledge of the existence of a trial with the specific intent to influence the result); Attorney 
Gen. v. Times Newspapers Ltd. [1974] AC 273, 299–300, 306–07, 322–25 (H.L.) (discussing the 
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presumed.116 The Appeals Chamber held that if the Trial Chamber had 
found that Mr. Nobilo actually read the transcript of Witness K’s evidence, 
or that someone told Mr. Nobilo that Witness K was protected, the 
Appeals Chamber would conclude that Mr. Nobilo had actual knowledge 
of the protective order.117 Because the Nobilo Trial Chamber had not made 
either finding, actual knowledge was not proven. The Appeals Chamber 
surmised that based on its opinion, the Trial Chamber could not have been 
fully satisfied of Mr. Nobilo’s actual knowledge beyond a “reasonable 
doubt.”118  
The Nobilo Appeals Chamber accepted the prosecution’s submission 
that willful blindness to a protective order was equally culpable as having 
actual knowledge and disregarding it.119 The prosecution argued that 
because the Trial Chamber found Mr. Nobilo guilty of a “deliberate failure 
to ascertain the circumstances surrounding Witness K’s protected 
status,”120 it intended to find that Mr. Nobilo was “willfully blind.”121 The 
Appeals Chamber rejected this argument.122 Alternatively, the prosecution 
argued that the Trial Court should have found Mr. Nobilo to have been 
willfully blind123 based on the circumstances supporting its holding.124 The 
Appeals Chamber, however, concluded that willful blindness cannot exist 
deliberate publication of material where the material would have the effect of influencing the result); 
Att’y Gen. v. News Paper Publ’g Plc. [1988] Ch 333, 314–15, 383 (Eng. C.A.) (involving the 
publication of a witness’ identity where protective measures have been granted on behalf of that 
witness with knowledge of those measures and with the specific intent to frustrate the effect of such 
protective measures); Attorney Gen. v. Leveller Magazine Ltd., at 452, 467–68, 471–72 (discussing 
interference with the due administration of justice). 
 116. Nobilo Appeals Chamber Decision, supra note 15, at para. 42. 
 117. Id. at para. 46–47.  
 118. Id. at para. 47. Because the Nobilo Trial Chamber felt the need to extend the meaning of 
actual knowledge to include not only a “deliberate violation” but also a “deliberate failure to 
ascertain,” the Appeals Chamber inferred that the Trial Chamber was not convinced that there was 
actual knowledge. See supra notes 101–02. The Tribunal’s reference to proof beyond “reasonable 
doubt” suggests that it is treating contempt as a criminal offense, although the punishment imposed 
(fine) suggests that the offense is civil in nature. The Tribunal’s unclear treatment of the offense 
appears in other contexts in which the court tries to maintain a neutral tone. See supra notes 33, 85. 
 119. Nobilo Appeals Chamber Decision, supra note 15, at para. 43, 46. The Nobilo Appeals 
Chamber also noted that mere negligence could never amount to “knowing and wilful” conduct, but 
that willful blindness is sufficiently culpable to warrant the punishment for contempt. Id. at para. 44–
45. The Nobilo Appeals Chamber left open the determination of whether other states of mind, such as 
reckless indifference to the existence of an order, would constitute contempt in terms of a knowing 
violation of the order. Id. 
 120. Nobilo Appeals Chamber Decision, supra note 15, at para. 49. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at para 50. 
 124. See supra notes 99–103. 
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unless there is already a suspicion that the order exists, and Mr. Nobilo 
had no reason to suspect that Witness K was protected.125
D. Judge Robinson’s Separate Opinion 
In a separate opinion, Judge Patrick Robinson concurred with the 
Nobilo Appeals Chamber’s holding, although he did not believe the 
proceedings should have been instituted at all.126 In Judge Robinson’s 
opinion, counsel’s job is to present evidence in the manner most favorable 
to his client.127 In this case, Mr. Nobilo did just that: without evidence of 
mala fides,128 “counsel should be given the benefit of the doubt.”129 In the 
end, Judge Robinson concluded that “much judicial time ha[d] been 
unnecessarily expended in [the] matter.”130
IV. CRITIQUE 
A. The Nobilo Appeals Chamber Sets Bad Precedent 
The Nobilo Appeals Chamber carefully followed the established 
precedent of the Vujin Appeals Chamber Decision by asserting its inherent 
jurisdiction over allegations of contempt,131 and procedurally, by 
specifically allowing evidence with probative value.132 Unlike the Nobilo 
 125. Nobilo Appeals Chamber Decision, supra note 15, at para. 51. First, the Nobilo Appeals 
Chamber reasoned that the fact Mr. Nobilo had been told the map in question was a public document 
presented in open session might have given him the impression that all circumstances surrounding the 
map were public. Id. Second, the Appeals Chamber reasoned that the fact that many protected 
witnesses give evidence in open session does not necessarily give rise to the suspicion that the witness 
is protected. Id. Finally, the Appeals Chamber noted that had Witness K been a victim as opposed to 
an expert witness, “it could perhaps be argued that counsel experienced in the Tribunal’s practices 
would be aware of the risk” of Witness K possibly being protected, but because Witness K was not a 
victim, circumstances requiring protective measures were not “immediately apparent.” Id. 
 126. Nobilo Appeals Chamber Decision, Separate Opinion of Judge Patrick Robinson, supra note 
15, at para. 1. 
 127. Id. at para. 4. 
 128. Id. at para. 4. Judge Robinson found there to be no evidence of bad intent on Mr. Nobilo’s 
part based on the fact that he “provided a statement . . . in which he made it clear that he had not 
known that the witness had been granted protective measures, . . . that ‘he had no motive in disclosing 
the witness’s name . . . that he had acted in good faith and that he was very sorry that the witness’s 
name had been revealed.’” Id. at para. 3. 
 129. Id. at para. 4. 
 130. Id. at para. 5. Judge Robinson declared that “[n]othing in this Opinion should be construed as 
in any way derogating . . . the protection of victims and witnesses . . . . However, in the result . . . 
much judicial time has been unnecessarily expended in this matter.” Id.  
 131. See supra notes 66–71, 111–12. 
 132. Vujin Appeals Chamber Decision, supra note notes 15, at para. 94. Evidence was submitted 
in support of Mr. Nobilo’s contentions that he was not “willfully blind” to Witness K’s protective 
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Trial Chamber Decision however, the Nobilo Appeals Chamber patently 
failed to take into account133 the public policy reasons supporting strict 
enforcement of the due administration of justice emphasized in the Vujin 
Appeals Chamber Decision.134
There are differences between the two cases. Namely, the Vujin 
Appeals Chamber was given clear evidence of contempt,135 and the Nobilo 
Trial Chamber dealt with less-conspicuous circumstances—whether or not 
Mr. Nobilo should have known he was acting in contempt.136 Also, each 
decision had a different Presiding Judge which may naturally account for 
some difference in opinion. Nevertheless, these differences are not strong 
enough to account for theremarkable fact that the Nobilo Appeals 
Chamber made no reference to either the Nobilo Trial Chamber or the 
Vujin Appeals Chamber’s emphasis on public policy.138
When an Appeals Chamber decision fails to mention the public policy 
repercussions of defense counsel’s violation of a witness’s court-ordered 
protective status, and overturns a Trial Chamber’s decision that punished 
such an offense, the message to potential witnesses is clear: court-ordered 
protection is meaningless. Such a decision contravenes the prominent 
public  policy reasons in favor of protecting witness and punishing those 
who offend the judicial process. What is more, the Nobilo Appeals 
Chamber’s message poignantly contradicts Ms. Del Ponte’s promise to 
protect witnesses in the ICTY.139  
Judge Robinson’s separate opinion suggests that public policy 
considerations are irrelevant if Mr. Nobilo had good intentions when he 
revealed Witness K’s identity.140 Judge Robinson assumed that Mr. Nobilo 
order.  
 133. The Nobilo Appeals Chamber quotes verbatim the Vujin Appeals Chamber’s general 
submission that “it is justice itself which is flouted by a contempt of court.” Nobilo Appeals Chamber 
Decision, supra note 15, at para. 36 (referring to Vujin Appeals Chamber Decision, supra note 23, at 
para. 16). 
 134. See supra notes 63–65. 
 135. See supra note 72. In the Vujin Appeals Chamber Decision, defense counsel had actual 
knowledge that he was presenting a false case, and expressly instructed witnesses not to name names. 
Vujin Appeals Chamber Decision, supra note 23, at para. 131–60. 
 136. Nobilo Trial Chamber Decision, supra note 16, at 4. See also supra notes 94, 98. By 
presenting a map in court, and in the process of cross-examining a protected witness, defense counsel 
divulged the protected witness’s identity and profession. Id. Essentially, the difference between the 
two situations is that in Vujin, it was clear that defense counsel knew what he was doing was wrong. 
See supra notes 134–36. In the Nobilo decisions, however, the issue came down to whether defense 
counsel “should have known” that he might be violating a court order. See supra notes 41–46, 103–10. 
 138. See supra notes 133–34. 
 139. See supra note 3.  
 140. Nobilo Appeals Chamber Decision, Separate Opinion of Judge Patrick Robinson, supra note 
15, 3–4. 
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acted in good faith and in the best interests of his client,141 and concluded 
that without evidence of bad faith, defense counsel should be given the 
benefit of the doubt and prosecutorial discretion ought to be exercised in 
his favor.142 To impute an ethical motive on the part of Mr. Nobilo is 
overgenerous, and certainly contradicts any public efforts to protect 
witnesses under the Tribunal’s authority and to encourage witness 
testimony.143  
B. The Rome Statute for the ICC—A Better System?  
Like the ICTY and the ICTR, the ICC has a special Victims and 
Witnesses Unit, and provides significant safeguards for their protection.144 
Unlike the ICTY and ICTR, the ICC places greater responsibility for 
witness protection on the Registrar, wherein public policy considerations 
are built into the system.145 Among the Registrar’s responsibilities in the 
ICC, it must provide witnesses with “adequate protective and security 
measures and formulat[e] long and short-term plans for their 
protection,”146 and it must recommend a code of conduct “emphasizing the 
vital nature of security and confidentiality for investigators of the Court” 
including defense.147  
Similarly, “adequate” measures in the ICTY should require specifically 
that the Registrar give appropriate and timely notice of a witness’s 
protected status in the form of a court directive to counsel. Given clear 
directions about confidentiality and who is protected, counsel would have 
no excuse for revealing a protected witness’s identity, whether intentional 
or not. In such a situation, when counsel fails to observe a court directive, 
he automatically commits misconduct and is subject to civil sanctions.148  
With a simple amendment akin to the ICC’s provisions, the ICTY and 
ICTR could impose a similar responsibility on the Registrar and thus 
 141. See supra note 128. 
 142. See supra note 129. 
 143. See supra notes 2–3.  
 144. See supra notes 44–53. But see Jacob Katz Cogan, International Criminal Courts and Fair 
Trials: Difficulties and Prospects, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 111, 128–31 (2002) (critiquing the 
international criminal courts incapacity to guarantee the observance of witness protection orders due to 
lack of state cooperation). The issue of state cooperation, although an interesting feature of the debate, 
falls outside the scope of this Recent Development.  
 145. See infra notes 146–47. 
 146. Rome Draft RPE, supra note 12, at Rule 17(2)(i). 
 147. See id. 17(2)(v). 
 148. Id. at Rule 171. 
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eliminate the problematic issue of proving actual knowledge or willful 
blindness.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The Nobilo Appeals Chamber Decision conspicuously fails to 
acknowledge the severe public policy repercussions of its decision, which 
will undoubtedly further discourage potential witnesses from coming 
forward in the ICTY. As it is, witnesses are reluctant to come forward, and 
with good reason.149 In contrast, the Nobilo Trial Chamber and the Vujin 
Appeals Chamber take a more balanced approach in their analysis of 
allegations of contempt, appropriately taking into account the public 
policy supporting witness protection measures in their final decision.150 As 
the ICTY is not bound to follow its decisions,151 the Appeals Chamber 
hopefully will recognize its public policy oversight in the Nobilo Appeals 
Chamber Decision. Nevertheless, a better overall system is needed: one 
that accounts inherently for public policy. If notice of witness protection 
were a court-ordered directive in the ICTY and ICTR as it is in the ICC, 
any failure to comply would be professional misconduct worthy of civil 
sanctions. This would send the appropriate message to witnesses that their 
protective status is taken seriously. As it now stands, the ICC will likely 
achieve more consistent, public policy-oriented results for witnesses.  
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